The Central Election Commission [CEC] of Georgia addresses an open letter to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

“Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

We decided to write this letter five months after the October 26, 2024 Parliamentary Elections, as the campaign to discredit the elections and the Georgian Election Administration has not ceased. The final straw in this regard was the raising of concerns over the decree in its resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which is purely technical in nature. Through this decision, the Election Administration merely clarified a legal provision that has existed in the Election Code for years.

We have reviewed your position regarding the decree and would like to note that, given our public statements and repeated explanations on this matter, we expected that, prior to deciding on issues concerning our activities, you would have shown interest in our position. However, the information presented in the document does not reflect the reality.

Therefore, we would like to present our position on this issue. Accordingly, we inform you that the Election Code of Georgia has always prohibited - and continues to prohibit - the processing and/or disclosure of voters’ personal data.

It is also important to note that the OSCE/ODIHR Final Report1 on the 2017 elections recommended amending the legislation to prohibit the collection and further processing of voters" personal data on election day, without restricting observers’ right to monitor all aspects of the voting process.

Following this, in 2018, legislative amendments were adopted prohibiting the photographing, videotaping, or other processing of information or data that is not considered public2 on election day. The OSCE/ODIHR also took note of this change in its 20183 report.

Accordingly, the prohibition on the improper processing of personal data has long been known to all electoral stakeholders, as evidenced by the existence of two versions of the voter list, as prescribed by law:

One is the public version of the list, which is provided to all interested authorized parties. The second is intended for the Election Commission and includes the lists uploaded into the verification machines, containing all voters’ personal data. This version does not constitute public information and, accordingly, its copying or any other form of processing was already prohibited by law.

The rights of observers are clearly defined in Article 41 of the Election Code of Georgia, and none of these rights have been, nor could be, restricted by the CEC decree.

With the above-mentioned decree, the CEC merely clarified the voting procedures to ensure the protection of voters’ personal data. This clarification was necessary due to numerous incidents recorded during previous elections, where some stakeholders violated the law by improperly observing election procedures, taking photos and videos, and failing to safeguard voters’ personal information.

It should also be noted that the OSCE/ODIHR report included a recommendation4 concerning photo and video recording, which was implemented through the aforementioned decree.

Considering all of the above, it should be clear why the court case on this issue was decided in favor of the Election Administration at all levels. The complaining political entity and the local observer organization have not - and could not - present a single valid argument to support their position, as no such arguments exist. Accordingly, it was evident from the outset that the purpose of their lawsuit was not to promote the “fairness” of the election process, but rather to discredit the Georgian Election Administration and the electoral process as a whole, both domestically and internationally. Unfortunately, they have partially achieved their goal, as the dissemination and endorsement of their so-called “arguments” - without proper verification - have become part of the agenda for some international partners and politicians.

Critics of the aforementioned decree, including those who provided you with information about it, are deliberately attempting to distort reality. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain how the high standard of protecting voters’ personal data is being misrepresented as a restriction on observers’ ability to monitor the registration process.

It is unfortunate, but the reality is that certain interested parties are using the aforementioned decree to promote the perception that elections in Georgia are not administered to proper standards, thereby creating a negative atmosphere in advance of the 2025 local self-government elections. In fact, all parties involved in the process are well aware that the allegations related to both the decree and the October 26 elections are unfounded.

We would like to remind you that following the announcement of the October 26, 2024 Parliamentary Election results, and in response to widespread claims of alleged fraud, the Election Administration, on its own initiative, appealed to the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia to request the initiation of an investigation in order to objectively assess these allegations. The Prosecutor’s Office’s interim statement, based on numerous investigative experiments and witness testimonies, revealed that no one - neither political actors nor monitoring organizations - had presented any concrete evidence to support the allegations made. Accordingly, it is now evident that the opponents’ goal is to undermine trust in the Election Administration and the electoral process as a whole through various false accusations. This strategy of eroding public confidence can have long-term consequences, as it fosters distrust and suspicion among voters, ultimately damaging the integrity of the electoral process and weakening the institution’s reputation and credibility.

The reality remains unchanged - the Election Administration conducted the October 26 elections at a highly professional level and in full compliance with the law, as confirmed, at the very least, by the assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission.

The October 26 elections were monitored by an unprecedented number of observers - 23,342 from 110 domestic observer organizations, 1,712 from 76 international organizations, and 2,827 representatives from 176 media outlets. No complaints were filed on election day that could have had a significant impact on the electoral process. Additionally, of the more than 53,000 members of precinct election commissions, over half were appointed by political parties. Eight out of the 17 members of each commission were appointed through the so-called opposition parties’ quota, and only nine commission members expressed a dissenting opinion in the summary protocols compiled on election day.

Moreover, after the voting ended, political actors initially celebrated their election results; however, once the counting process began and the actual outcomes differed from their expectations, they changed their strategy. For example, the electoral subject "Coalition for Change – Gvaramia, Melia, Girchi, Droa, which was conducting an alternative vote count on its own website, took the site offline after realizing that its results aligned with those of the Election Administration. Meanwhile, the local monitoring organization ISFED refused to publish its PVT results when they mirrored those of the Election Administration. They even publicly acknowledged this, and their actions ultimately contributed to further aggravating the already polarized environment in the country. Notably, this is the second time that ISFED has manipulated the results of its conducted PVT. The public still remembers the incident related to the 2020 Parliamentary Elections, when the organization published inaccurate results, thereby contributing to increased polarization in the country. But now, let us return to the October 26, 2024 elections.

The issue, which became one of the main arguments for discrediting the elections, only emerged three days after the voting. It was at that point that certain interested parties began to claim that the marker was leaking through the ballot paper, allegedly compromising the secrecy of the vote. This is despite the fact that, during the voting and the following two days, only five complaints were submitted to the District Election Commissions regarding this issue. This clearly indicates that the marker ink leakage - especially considering the use of the frame-envelope - was not a significant issue and was not perceived as such. Simply because they could not identify any other tangible flaws, the interested parties chose to target the Election Administration over this issue—something one of them even openly admitted on television.

We monitor the practices of countries that have implemented electronic voting technologies, and both we and you are aware that, unlike Georgia, many of these countries do not use envelopes at all during the voting process, making the voter"s choice visible. However, for some reason, this issue is not considered problematic in their case, while in ours - where a ballot is placed face-down in a framed envelope and even a faint trace of marker ink does not reveal which electoral subject was selected - it is regarded as a violation of voting secrecy. Approaching the issue with such a double standard is, to say the least, incomprehensible.

If we refer back to the OSCE/ODIHR report on the October 26 elections and compare it with reports on elections held in other countries, we will see that, in some cases, much harsher criticisms are made regarding those countries. Yet, no one speaks of election fraud in their cases. This naturally leads to a rhetorical question - why?

There are no perfect elections in any country. There is always room to further improve the process. The Georgian Election Administration also strives to make each election more refined and effective than the last. It was with this very goal in mind that, last year, we undertook large-scale efforts and successfully introduced electronic voting technologies in the country. Unfortunately, however, there is now an attempt to undermine this entire process - simply because certain political forces did not achieve their desired outcome.

In fact, despite significant challenges, the Georgian Election Administration successfully implemented a large-scale electoral reform at the highest level, as confirmed by the technology compliance audit conducted by the election technology testing laboratory "Pro V&V". The company has many years of experience operating in the United States and is one of only two firms accredited by the relevant U.S. institutions. It is also important to note that during the October 26 elections, the Election Administration implemented additional mechanisms to enhance the transparency and credibility of the modernized electoral process. One of the key factors was the presence of the so-called "paper trail," which aligned with European standards and enabled verification and monitoring of all stages of the vote counting process. This, in turn, provided additional safeguards against the manipulation of voting procedures. To prevent potential manipulations and eliminate cyber interference, we have developed a secure, internet-free electronic election model.

If anyone is genuinely interested in the truth about the elections held in Georgia on October 26, 2024, or any specific decision made by the Election Administration, we are fully prepared to provide well-reasoned answers to all questions.

The Georgian Election Administration has always maintained close relations with international organizations, including representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and we remain open to continued cooperation. It is for this reason that we have decided to address you with this letter and remind you of the actual facts, so that when discussing matters related to us, you can rely on verified information rather than the narratives being actively promoted by interested parties. Otherwise, the long-standing and successful cooperation between our institutions risks losing its significance.

We kindly urge you to verify any information received from interested parties with the relevant authority - in this case, the Election Administration - and to seek accurate details directly from the primary source. We respectfully ask that process not be viewed superficially, as your public statements and assessments can significantly influence the already polarized environment in Georgia.

For our part, we express our full readiness - within the scope of our competence - to consider and, where possible, take into account all recommendations aimed at improving the electoral process. We are firmly convinced that now is the appropriate time to initiate this dialogue and engage in a constructive discussion among all parties in a calm and respectful environment, rather than further escalating tensions.

Sincerely, Central Election Commission of Georgia”, - reads the letter.