The Democracy Research Institute is responding to the annual report of the State Security Service [SSS]. DRI still finds it problematic how the State Security Service responds to far-right extremism, as well as the fact that the mandate to investigate and, in particular, to investigate corruption crimes, is granted to an agency having an intelligence function, and the lack of adequate parliamentary oversight mechanisms over the service.

“The report notes that the threat posed by the far-right extremism has reached a new, critical level.
In its reports and statements, the Democracy Research Institute has repeatedly pointed out the strengthening of the radical ideological groups as a result of the wrong policies pursued by the State. These groups, encouraged by impunity, have recently become active and dangerous. The delayed launch of investigations against leaders of far-right extremist groups, allowing these individuals to mobilize large numbers of forces and commit new offences, should be particularly emphasized. When evaluating the efforts of the State Security Service in terms of combating far-right extremism, the following problematic aspects should be highlighted:
1. Inadequate regulatory framework and the threat of persecution of people with different opinions - The 2020 report devotes a separate chapter to far-right extremism and describes in more detail the threat posed by Russia in this regard. This is undoubtedly a step forward and deserves a positive assessment, given that the associations of this ideology are the main source of the spread of disinformation, radicalization and extremist ideology in Georgia. It should be noted, however, that there is no legislative definition of far-right extremist ideology. Without a proper regulatory framework, following and prosecuting members of these groups pose a risk of persecution of critics, including the media and non-governmental organizations. It should be noted that the investigations launched by the SSS into the cases of disinformation and discrimination on ethnic and national grounds are directed not against the far-right extremist groups or their leaders, but against critical media outlets and NGOs.
Indicating in the SSS report that specific individuals have been exposed of the named actions, without providing the relevant evidentiary standard, may serve to discredit these organizations.
2019. B) Insufficient involvement of the society in the fight against extremist ideology - The attempt to improve the quality of cooperation between the State Security Service and the civil sector deserves a positive assessment. Nevertheless, civil society is not sufficiently involved in the fight against violent extremism. It should be noted that the Democracy Research Institute has been requesting, through the court, declassification of the action plan (or part of it) developed within the framework of the Georgian National Strategy on Combating Terrorism since 2019. Without access to this action plan (or part of it), it will be impossible to outline the areas of potential cooperation or plan relevant projects, which cast doubt on the achievement of the goals of the strategy and the involvement of the society in the fight against radicalization and extremism.

Anti-corruption agency and fight against corruption

Performing investigative, and especially anti-corruption, functions by a body with intelligence power is problematic, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the non-governmental sector. As a rule, the activities of the security services are characterized by a high degree of secrecy, which reduces the possibility of democratic control/oversight over them. Accordingly, security services should be strictly limited to the protection of the national security interest and should not carry out activities that are not closely linked with national security.
The SSS report states that corruption in public institutions endangers national security. The explanation of the Service that any corruption offence poses a threat to national interests is inconsistent with both the best anti-corruption practices of different countries and the explanations of the European Court of Human Rights. The 2020 report clearly illustrates that the vast majority of cases investigated by the Service’s Anti-Corruption Agency do not involve risks to the national security of the State or its interests.
The 2020 report does not make it clear in which case the Service’s Anti-Corruption Agency launches an investigation and in which case it sends a case to other structures. In one of the cases, the SSS detected an attempted fraud in large amount committed by a group, which did not belong to the investigative jurisdiction of the SSS and definitely did not fall under its competence.
 
Operational-Technical Agency and personal data protection

According to the report, “During the reporting year, the State Inspector had been provided with all information requested in accordance with law and all the conditions necessary for the effective exercise of the Inspector"s authority had been provided”. Apart from this general information, the report says nothing about: How many times, by what methods or in what form was the Agency inspected by the supervisory body. It should be noted that the State Inspector’s Office supervises only covert investigative activities carried out in accordance with law. Preventing and combating the illegal collection of personal data by investigative bodies is beyond the competence of this service.
According to the 2020 report, the LEPL Operational-Technical Agency, carries out its duties under proper supervision, and in compliance with human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, there are a number of questions relating to the Agency"s activities.
Although the key to covert investigative activities is in the hands of the Operational-Technical Agency operating under the State Security Service, the report says nothing about the illegally obtained secret telephone or video recordings that have taken become a tool of political retaliation.

In view of the above, DRI considers it important to ensure the following:
 
Improvement in the quality of cooperation between the State Security Service and the civil sector;
The State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs should ensure a tough and fair approach to perpetrators of hate crimes;
The far-right extremist ideology should be defined at the legislative level and investigation of the violent acts committed by the leaders of these ideological groups should be conducted in the shortest period of time;
Complete or partial declassification of the action plan developed within the framework of the Georgian National Strategy on Combating Terrorism at the initiative of the State Security Service;
The State Security Service should be deprived of the authority to investigate corruption crimes (before legislative changes are made, the Anti-Corruption Agency of the State Security Service should investigate only cases that pose an immediate threat to national security);
The State Security Service should focus on the illegally obtained secret recordings, as well as causes, responses and possible solutions, in its parliamentary reports;
The annual reports of the State Security Service should indicate the form, frequency and methods of inspection of the LEPL Operational-Technical Agency by the State Inspector;
A national cyber ​​security strategy and action plan should be developed for an effective fight against cybercrime, with the participation of non-governmental sector and experts”, - reads the report.